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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Everyone has a story about how they discovered that their taxi driver was an Eastern European 
scientist.  Many taxi drivers, in turn, tell stories about how their Indian passengers are nearly always 
computer scientists.  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the empirical basis for these popular 
perceptions.  We address three related questions.  How wide-spread is unskilled employment 
among educated immigrants?  Does the incidence differ with the country of origin of immigrants?  
Can the differences, if any, be explained by certain observable attributes of the country of origin? 
 
Our results demonstrate, first, the striking differences in the occupational attainment of immigrants 
with similar educational backgrounds but from different countries.  Even after we control for age, 
experience and education level, we find that highly educated immigrants from certain countries are 
less likely to obtain skilled jobs.  For example, a hypothetical 34 year old Indian college graduate 
who arrived in 1994, has a 69% probability of obtaining a skilled job while the probability is only 
24% for a Mexican immigrant of identical age, experience and education.  Among the lowest 
probabilities of obtaining skilled jobs are for several Latin American, Eastern European and Middle 
Eastern countries.  Next, we find that a large part of this country-level variation can be explained by 
certain country attributes. Some of these attributes affect the quality of human capital accumulated 
at home, such as expenditure on tertiary education and the use of English as a medium of education.  
Other attributes lead to a selection effect, i.e. variation in the abilities of migrants because they are 
drawn from different sections of the skill distribution of their home countries, and include the GDP 
per capita, the distance to the US, and the openness of US immigration policies to residents of a 
given country.  The existence of military conflict in the home country can have both a quality 
effect, because it weakens institutions that create human capital, and a selection effect, because it 
lowers the threshold quality of immigrants. 
 
Our work is related to two strands in the literature on migration.  The "assimilation" literature 
comprises a wide range of rigorous empirical analyses focusing on the performance of migrants in 
the host country (surveyed in Borjas, 1994).  The "brain drain" literature consists of sophisticated 
theoretical, but rather limited empirical work focusing on the effects of skilled migration, mostly on 
the home country (surveyed in Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2003).  There has, however, 
been little investigation of the possibility of "brain waste", where the skilled and the educated leave 
their home country, but then make little use of their skills and education in the host country.   3
 
How immigrants perform in host country labor markets is one of the fundamental questions in the 
migration literature (Borjas,1994).  The existing literature focuses primarily on earnings as a 
measure of performance.  We examine, instead, occupational outcomes, particularly of the highly 
educated and those with professional qualifications.  Earnings do not reveal what immigrants 
actually do, even though they are likely to be correlated with occupational choices.  If the global 
creation and allocation of human capital are a concern, then it is of interest what kind of jobs the 
highly educated immigrants obtain.  For example, if most university graduates or professionals 
from a country end up in unskilled jobs when they migrate, then obtaining a better sense of their 
eventual destiny may help them and their countries improve their allocation of expenditures on 
education and training. 
 
Early studies in the migration literature note that the similarity of the home country to the United 
States, and immigration law in the United States may influence the quality distribution of 
immigrants (Chiswick 1978, 1985).  But this empirical research does not really focus on the links 
between the characteristics of the home country and immigration behavior (Borjas 1985, Chiswick 
1985).  Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986) make a serious effort to disentangle the root causes of 
earnings differences across different groups.  Their theoretical framework examines how home 
country conditions influence the decisions to migrate as well as the decisions to remain in the 
United States after migration.  Their results indicate that almost all differences in earnings are 
eliminated when differences in country characteristics influencing migration and re-migration 
decisions (such as measures of origin country attractiveness, costs of migration, the quantity and 
quality of information, and the country specific restrictions of U.S. migration law) are taken into 
account. 
 
Borjas’ (1987) influential paper points out that income-maximizing behavior on the part of potential 
migrants can create selection biases which are influenced by the characteristics of the home country 
income distributions.  His empirical analysis of the earnings of immigrants from 41 countries using 
the 1970 and 1980 censuses shows that differences in the U.S. earnings of immigrants with the 
same measured skills were attributable to variations in political and economic conditions (measured 
by GNP, level of income inequality, and "competitiveness" of political systems) in the home 
countries at the time of migration.  In particular, persons from Western European countries do quite 
well in the United States whereas persons from less developed countries perform poorly in terms of 
earnings.  To obtain a more dynamic perspective, Borjas (1991) examines data on immigrants’   4
occupations from the 1940, 1960, 1970 and 1980 censuses and finds a significant negative trend in 
immigrant representation in skilled occupations.  He argues that the negative trend is due to the 
shifting source country mix of the U.S. immigration flow in this period.  Our results indicate that 
differences in earnings may reflect not just differences in educational attainments of immigrants 
from different countries, but also that nominally identical education levels from different countries 
translate into different human capital levels and job placement. 
 
More recently, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1998) focus on the responses of potential immigrants to 
changes in the U.S.  immigration law regime as well as determinants of demand for immigration in 
the home country, and the impact of these changes on the skill composition of immigrants.  Using a 
new data set of all new, legal immigrants over the period 1972 through 1995, they find that the 
average skill of legal immigrants has been rising relative to that of the U.S.  population.  The main 
reason is found to be changes in U.S. immigration law, notably the Immigration Act of 1990 that 
trebled the ceilings for the relatively high-skilled employment visas while at the same time reducing 
the numbers of low-skilled employment visas issued, and the increase in skill prices in source 
countries (as measured by GDP per worker). Their results are confirmed in the recent paper by 
Chiquiar and Hanson (forthcoming) who show that the recent immigrants from Mexico are drawn 
from the upper-middle section of the wage distribution indicating positive selection effects.  
 
Methodologically, our paper is most closely related to Green (1999), who compares immigrant and 
native born occupational distributions for Canada.  He uses a multinomial logit model of 
occupational choice and data from the 1981, 1986 and 1991 Canadian censuses.  He finds little 
evidence of immigrants being underrepresented in more skilled occupations relative to native-born 
workers with similar education and experience characteristics.  One reason is the screening by 
Canadian immigration authorities for more skilled and more educated immigrants under the 
"points" system.  Furthermore, differences in occupational attainment are linked more to linguistic 
fluency-based differences than differences in source country.  Accordingly, no effort is made in the 
paper to relate outcomes to the differences in home country attributes. 
 
The results of the Green (1999) paper are not in line with other papers on Canada.  For example, 
Baker and Benjamin (1994) find using Canadian data from the 1971, 1981 and 1986 censuses that 
immigrants earn a lower rate of return on education relative to the native born.  Similarly, Green 
(1995) finds that inability to transfer credentials imposes a severe penalty on the immigrant.  These   5
findings suggest that within the skilled, it is important to distinguish between occupations with 
regulatory entry barriers (e.g.  the legal and medical professions) and those without. 
 
Reitz (2001) goes further, and estimates that in Canada in 1996 a substantial part of the "immigrant 
earnings deficit" was due to immigrant skill under-utilization and pay iniquity.  However, the 
evidence presented in the paper suggests only that immigrants obtain a lower return on their 
aggregate education and experience than that obtained by host country citizens.  The attribution of 
this difference to skill under utilization and pay iniquity rather than lower immigrant skill quality is 
on the basis of ad hoc assumptions.  Given the existing data for Canada and the United States, a 
disentanglement of the relative importance of these different effects does not seem possible. 
 
Using detailed data from Israel, another country which experienced a large influx of skilled 
migrants, Friedberg (2000) focuses on the source of the immigrants' human capital.  She finds that 
human capital is imperfectly portable, and the national origin of an individual's education and 
experience is a crucial determinant of their value in the labor market.  The portability of education 
is found to vary significantly with its level: elementary school education is equally valued, 
regardless of where it was acquired, but the source of higher education matters.  The return to 
education obtained abroad is found to be higher for immigrants from Europe and the Western 
Hemisphere than for immigrants from Asia and Africa.  But again she makes no effort to link 
differences in performance to home country attributes.  The interesting question of why nominally 
identical education acquired in different countries produces dramatically different outcomes is thus 
not addressed. 
 
The other strand of literature relevant to our paper is on the brain drain (see the survey by 
Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters, 2003).  The main focus in this literature has been the 
negative impact of the migration of skilled individuals on the sending developing countries, due to 
decline in positive externalities that an educated labor force generates within the economy, lost 
investments in education and loss of tax revenue (see, for example, Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974 
and Bhagwati, 1976).  More recent work has pointed to benefits for source countries of return 
migration, resource repatriation, migrant networks and the flow of information and knowledge (e.g.  
Puri and Ritzema, 2000, Ratha, 2003).  The magnitude of such benefits is likely to depend on how 
emigrants perform in the host country labor market, and substantial underachievement abroad could 
diminish potential benefits.   
   6
Another possible positive impact of emigration is through improved incentives to acquire human 
capital (Mountford, 1997, Vidal, 1998, and Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997, 1998).  In this 
context, Commander et al.  (2003) argue that the screening of immigrants in the receiving country 
is of major importance in determining the welfare implications of brain drain.  In effect, if it is 
known that only the best are selected, then the incentive to acquire additional human capital for the 
marginal potential migrant is zero.  Similarly, if it is known that the rate of return abroad on local 
educational qualifications is low, then the possibility of emigration offers little additional incentive 
to acquire human capital. 
 
2.  Data 
 
Empirical research on issues linked to "brain drain" has been constrained by the scarcity of data.  
One exceptional source is the US Census which includes detailed information on the social and 
economic status of foreign-born people in the United States.  The data in this paper are from the 1% 
sample of the 2000 Census
1.  We restrict our analysis to foreign-educated males who are between 
25-65 years old and employed at the time of the census.
2  Each individual observation in the census 
has a population weight attached to it which is that representative observation's proportion in the 
overall US population.  We end up with more than 200,000 observations in our dataset which 
corresponds to around 4.5 million people in the US.  Each individual in the census declares an 
education level and a profession.  The education levels are: (1) less than 4 years, (2) 5-9 years, (3) 
9-12 years, (4) high-school, (5) some college, (6) bachelors degree, (7) masters degree, (8) 
professional degree
3 and (9) doctorate degree.   
 
There are over 500 separate occupations in the census and we group them into six main categories, 
based on the job description and the average educational attainment
4: 
(i) Scientist - average education is above 18 years and most people have doctorate degrees;   
includes medical and life scientists as well as social scientists. 
                                                 
1 Extracts from the  Census samples were made through IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series), 
which is a database maintained by Minnesota Population Center at University of Minnesota 
(http://beta.ipums.org/usa/index.html). 
2 The census asks the respondents their level of education, but not where they obtained it.  However, we know 
the age at which the immigrant entered the United States.  So based on this information, we designate a 
person "US educated" if they arrived in the US before they would have normally finished their declared 
education level.  For example, if a university graduate arrived at the age of 23 or older, then he is considered 
"foreign educated." 
3 According to census, these are medical, law, optometry, dentistry, pharmacy and veterinary degrees. 
4 Educational attainments were obtained by computing the average years of education in each profession, with 
all US-born and foreign-born people (males and females) included.   7
(ii) Professional - average education is above 18 years and most people have professional degrees;  
includes lawyers and physicians. 
(iii) Skilled - average education is above 16 years;  includes managers, accountants, engineers, 
social workers and teachers. 
(iv) Professional Support - average education is between 12-16 years and are related to professional 
categories;  includes medical technicians and legal support. 
 (v) Semi-skilled - the average education is between 12-16 years;  includes engineering technicians, 
police, secretaries and administrative assistants. 
(vi) Unskilled  - the average education is below 12 years;  includes waiters, salespersons, cashiers, 
construction laborers, automotive mechanics and drivers. 
 
We divide the data into separate cohorts depending on the decade of arrival: 1980s and 1990s.  
Table 1 provides the distributions of the observations in each cohort across education levels and 
professional categories.  For example, in our sample, we have close to 103,000 foreign-educated 
men who arrived in the 1990s.  13% of them had bachelor’s and 18.6% had high-school degrees.  
When we look at professional placement, we see that 13.6% had skilled and 72.7% had unskilled 
jobs.  In terms of place of origin, 19% came from Asian and 60% came from Latin American 
countries.  There are  (exactly) 130 countries represented in the sample with Mexico as the home 
country for around 40% of the total.  When we examine the changes across cohorts, we see that 
average education levels of immigrants and the ratio of immigrants in higher-skill professions have 
both gone up in the 1990s.  Finally, the ratio of immigrants from most geographic regions stayed 
stable over time with two exceptions; there is a slight decline from Latin America and Asia and 
increase from Eastern Europe and developed  countries (which include European Union, Canada, 
Australia and Japan) in the 1990s compared to the 1980s.   
 
The most important variable in our paper is the education level of immigrants.  22.5% of foreign-
educated immigrants arriving in the 1990s have at least a college degree but there is large variation 
in the educational levels across different home countries (Chart 1).  For example, developed 
countries (defined as above) have the highest average educational levels, but Asia, Eastern Europe, 
Middle East and Africa are not far behind.  Furthermore, the average education levels of 
immigrants from these countries is higher than the native-born Americans within the comparable 
sample in the census.  Latin American countries, however, present a sharp contrast.  For example, 
only 2% immigrants from the three largest source countries, Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala,    8
 



































































































































































































































































































































Higher Education Rest of Immigrants
875  9
have college or higher degrees.  Average level of college attainment for the rest of Latin America in 
our sample is only 15%. 
 
The differences in educational levels of immigrants from different countries can be due to two 
separate reasons.  First, the average education level in their home countries might vary.  Second, the 
immigrants might be disproportionately drawn from the highly educated (or the uneducated) 
portions of their native country.  Figure 1 depicts the distribution of selected countries along these 
two dimensions: the proportion with tertiary education among immigrants to the United States 
against the proportion of tertiary education enrollment in the home country.  It is evident that the 
education level among Latin American immigrants is even lower than the average levels in their 
home countries.  In contrast, immigrants from Africa, Middle East and Asia to the US are on 
average highly educated even though their home countries have low average education levels.  This 
confirms that immigrants do not constitute a random sample from the population of their home 
countries, an issue to which we return in the empirical section.   
 
Figure 1:  Tertiary education at home and among immigrants to the US, 1990s   10
 
3.  Empirical framework 
 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two stages.  We first examine how far the labor market 
placement of immigrants in the United States is attributable to their country of origin, after 
controlling for the key individual attributes such as education, age and experience.  We then explore 
how much of the variation attributable to the country of origin is explained by differences in 
observable characteristics of the countries of origin.   
 
3.1.  Does immigrant performance depend on country of origin? 
 
We use a multinomial logit, which is estimated separately for each cohort.  Multinomial logit does 
not require the set of alternatives to be ordered in any sense.  The model for occupational placement 
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Yi, the dependent variable, is the occupational choice for immigrant i, and j is one of the six main 
professional categories identified earlier: science, professional, skilled, professional support, semi-
skilled and unskilled.  The explanatory variables xi  are the following: 
 
(i) Education - This is represented through eight different dummy variables which take the value of 
1 for the highest degree the individual obtained and zero otherwise. 
(ii) Age and Age squared - These approximate for the aggregate experience of the individual.
5 
(iii) Years in the United States and its square - These approximate for the experience of the 
individual in the US labor market. 
(iv) Country dummy variables - These capture all the relevant country characteristics that influence 
the individual's performance.  We use a dummy variable for each one of the 130 countries 
represented in the sample. 
 
                                                 
5 It is standard in the literature to use the quadratic form to capture the impact of age and experience, see e.g.  
Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986).   11
We perform the multinomial logit estimation separately for each cohort using the population 
weights of the individuals in the estimation.  The coefficients estimated by the logit model are 
difficult to interpret and we have close to 2,000 coefficients when the country dummies are taken 
into account which makes it hard to present them
6.  However, the advantage of logit models is that 
conditional probabilities of  specific outcomes can be calculated from the estimated coefficients.  
Therefore, we calculate probabilities of being in a specific job category for any hypothetical 
individual with certain characteristics.  For example, for the 1990s cohort, we take a 34 year old 
who has been in the US for 6 years which are the average age and arrival date in this cohort.  Then, 
we calculate the probability of this individual obtaining a skilled (or any of the other five 
professions) job for any given combination of education level and home country.  This enables us to 
compare home country effects on labor market outcomes among individuals who have the same 
degree of education but obtained in different countries.  Then, we also explore whether there are 
significant differences with earlier cohorts.  Finally, we take a closer look at immigrants with 
professional qualifications. 
 
Chart 2 presents estimated probabilities for bachelor and professional degree holders who arrived in 
the 1990s from a select group of countries.  The estimates for all education levels for all 130 
countries are presented in Table 2.  It is evident that these probabilities vary significantly across 
countries.  A 34 year old Indian who arrived in 1994 and has a bachelors degree, has a 69% 
probability of obtaining a skilled job while the probability is only 24% for a Mexican of identical 
age, experience and education.  Among the lowest probabilities are for several Latin American, 
Eastern European and Middle Eastern countries.  The second column in Table 2 keeps age and 
years in the US same but increases the education level to a masters degree.  The probabilities 
naturally increase, but even with a masters degree a Mexican still has only a 43% probability of 
obtaining a skilled job, while the probability for an Indian is 80%. 
 
                                                 
6 Given the sample size, almost all of the estimates are statistically significant.   12
Chart 2:  Probability of obtaining a skilled job conditional on education level – 1990s
Probability that a foreign educated 
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We see that the probability of obtaining a science or professional job is almost zero for individuals 
with bachelors and masters degree, so we do not report these.  However, individuals with a 
professional degree could well hold other skilled jobs.  Although we calculate the probabilities of   13
obtaining different types of jobs separately for each education level, we report in Chart 2 and 
column 3 of Table 2 the sum of the probabilities of obtaining science, professional and other skilled 
jobs for somebody with a professional degree.  (We analyze the performance of professional degree 
holders in more detail in a later section.) We see that the same relative patterns are maintained and 
that there are large variations across countries of origin even when individuals have identical age, 
experience and nominal education. Again, some of the lowest probabilities are for Latin America 
and Eastern Europe countries, but Middle Eastern professionals perform much better relative to 
other countries than Middle Eastern graduates.  In other words, ostensibly identical educational 
degrees are not treated equally. 
 
One intriguing question is whether these patterns have changed over time.  As emphasized in the 
literature (see Borjas, 1994), there might be strong cohort differences in the quality of immigrants.  
In Table 1, we observe that the average education level of immigrants went up considerably over 
1990s.  While the ratio of immigrants with less than elementary education decreased from 16.4% to 
8.6%, the ratio with at least a college degree increased from 16.9% to 22.5%.   
 
The shift in the cohort composition is the reason why we estimated the multinomial logit separately 
for the three cohorts in our data.  As in the previous section, we calculate the probabilities of 
obtaining skilled jobs for individuals with bachelors degrees across cohorts and countries.  These 
are reported in the last two columns of Table 2  The individual in the fourth column is 44 years old 
and has been in the US for 16 years while the third column is for an individual who is 54 years old 
and has migrated 26 years ago.  Again all of these age and the year of immigration are the mean 
values for each cohort.   
 
We see in Column 4 that the pattern of cross-country variations is mostly preserved.  When we 
compare columns 1 and 4, however, we see that countries have witnessed significant changes in the 
performance of their emigrants.  Certain countries such as India, China, Kenya, Hungary, Italy and 
South Africa have witnessed a significant improvement in the 1990s, whereas the opposite is true 
for countries like Austria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Uruguay.    Apart from changes 
in the country of origin, these cohort differences might be attributable to changes in the 
immigration policies of the US: e.g.  during the 1980s, a large number of immigrants arrived under 
flexible family preferences while this policy was tightened in the 1990s. 
   14
The performance of professional degree holders is of particular interest.  Do explicit entry barriers 
in certain professions (such as licensing and other entry requirements in medicine, law etc.) impose 
additional burdens on certain immigrants and affect their ability to obtain jobs commensurate with 
their education? In Table 3, we present the probabilities of obtaining different kinds of jobs for 
individuals with professional degrees for a sample of countries.  The top half of the table is for the 
1990s cohort and the bottom half is for the 1980s.  The representative individual from the 1990s 
cohort is again 34 years old and has been in the US for 6 years.  We see, for example, if the 
immigrant came from Canada, there is a 62% probability that he will obtain a professional job, 4% 
probability of a science job and 23% probability of another skilled job.  In fact, immigrants from 
ex-British colonies, such as Canada, India, Egypt and Nigeria, seem to be especially successful in 
obtaining professional jobs.  We investigate this further in the next section, but note that this may 
be due to the compatibility of educational and professional systems (such as law) as well as the 
advantage of sharing a common language.  The next observation is that immigrants from other 
developed countries, such as United Kingdom obtain a relatively large number of skilled jobs, 
including managerial positions.  Interestingly, the Chinese and Japanese immigrants are relatively 
highly represented in science related jobs.  Finally, immigrants from Latin American countries, 
such as Mexico and Brazil, and Eastern European countries, such as Russia, have high probabilities 
on ending up with unskilled jobs. 
 
The results from the 1980s cohorts are slightly different.  With some exception, immigrants who 
arrived in the 1980s, particularly from Russia, Brazil, Vietnam and Mexico, have a higher 
probability of obtaining professional jobs compared to the 1990s cohort.  One explanation could be 
that there are differences in quality across cohorts.  The second is that it takes time to overcome the 
various hurdles to enter a profession.  Since we do not have data on exactly when an individual 
obtains a professional job, it is hard to identify the real cause.   
 
4.  What explains immigrant performance differences across countries of origin? 
   
The previous section established that there is large variation in terms of labor market placements 
among similarly educated immigrants depending on their home countries.  If the labor market in the 
United States is efficient and there is no discrimination, then the probabilities we calculated in the 
previous section reflect the "average quality" of the immigrants from a particular country in a 
particular cohort.  In this section, we aim to identify the determinants of the "quality" differences by 
country of origin.     15
 
The previous literature (beginning with Borjas (1987) and Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986)) has 
sought to explain differences in the earnings of individual immigrants on the basis of differences in 
their levels of education and other explanatory variables which typically include source country 
attributes.  Instead, we seek to explain differences in the occupational placement of individuals who 
have nominally identical levels of education.  In terms of the conventional analysis, our exercise 
can be seen as an examination of the interaction between levels of education and other relevant 
variables, but as far as we know such an analysis has not been previously undertaken. 
 
We divide our explanatory variables into two categories.  Quality variables explain why nominally 
identical educational qualifications obtained in different source countries are valued differently in 
the US labor market.  Selection variables explain why even if we control for differences in the 
quality of education, the abilities of migrants from different source countries differ because they are 
drawn from different segments of the source country ability distribution. 
 
As our dependent variable, we use the different probabilities estimated using the multinomial logit 
in the previous section, defined as pkt, where k is for country and t is for cohort: 
 
pkt = α + β1DISTk + β 2CONFLICTkt + β 3ENGLISHk + β 4EDUC_expkt + β 5GDPkt  
+ β 6FPkt + εkt 
 
Note that the above equation is estimated separately for each cohort to isolate cohort effects.  The 
explanatory variables are: natural log of the distance to US (DIST); the presence of military conflict 
(CONFLICT); English language dummy (ENGLISH); natural log of tertiary education expenditure 
per student (EDUC_exp); natural log of the GDP per capita (GDP); ratio of immigrants obtaining 
residency rights by means such as family preferences, visa lotteries and political asylum, to 
population of origin country (FP).  Detailed definitions and data sources for these variables are 
available in the Data Appendix. 
 
In the class of quality variables, we include the natural log of tertiary education expenditure 
(EDUC_exp) per student during the relevant period adjusted for purchasing power parity, and a 
dummy variable  (ENGLISH) that takes the value of 1 if English is the spoken language in the 
home country.  Both these variables can be expected to have a positive influence on the individual’s 
human capital and lead to more favorable occupational placement in the US labor market.     16
 
In the class of selection variables, we include, first of all, a set of source country variables:  natural 
log of the home country GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity, distance from the 
United States (DIST) and a dummy variable (CONFLICT) that reflects the presence of military 
conflict in the home country during the decade the migrant arrived in the US.   
 
Instead of just home country GDP, it would have been preferable to have data on the average 
earnings of graduates or professionals, and the distribution of such earnings, but such data are 
available only for a small number of countries.  For higher GDP countries, the opportunity cost of 
migrating is high, and so only individuals with high income potential would emigrate to and remain 
in the United States.  Furthermore, as Borjas (1987) has argued, since the distribution of income in 
many of the other industrial countries is more equal than that in the United States, we would again 
expect those at the upper tail of home country distributions to migrate to the United States.  For 
countries with per capita GDP substantially lower than that of the United States, the relative 
distribution of income is irrelevant and it can be assumed that both low and high ability individuals 
would wish to migrate.  But it is conceivable that in some of the poorest countries only the more 
capable have the means to migrate.  So source country GDP per capita is likely to matter, but there 
is only a weak presumption that it will have a positive association with the probability of obtaining 
a skilled job. 
 
Distance has conventionally been regarded as an important determinant of the cost of migration, but 
it too has a somewhat ambiguous influence.  On the one hand, it can be seen as reflecting the cost 
of migration, which would suggest a positive selection effect: only those who expect to do well 
would be willing to incur the costs of travel.  A second related reason is that people from distant 
countries (such as in Asia, Africa or the Middle East) may have closer migration options (such as 
Europe and the Persian Gulf).  If the US rewards human capital more than these other destination 
countries, then immigrants will again self select and US will attract the higher quality migrants 
from distant countries.  On the other hand, distance also reflects the cost of return (Borjas and 
Bratsberg, 1996 and Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1986).  If migrants are not fully informed about their 
prospects, and these are revealed to them only on arrival in the United States, then it would be less 
costly for a disappointed Mexican to return home than a disappointed Russian.  Since our data 
pertains to those who came to the US and decided not to return home, both effects are present. 
   17
The presence of conflict in the home country can be expected to lower the threshold of those who 
would want to migrate because it reduces the opportunity cost of staying.  In low GDP countries, 
where the desire to migrate is not in question and the constraint is the means to migrate, the 
existence of conflict may still act as a powerful push factor.  Furthermore, political instability might 
also have a quality effect, causing a decline in human capital accumulation of the citizens and make 
them less qualified for high-skilled jobs in the US.  So we would expect a negative influence of 
conflict on achievement. 
 
The final, and perhaps most critical, selection variable is not an attribute of the source country but 
the immigration policies of the host country.  There are three main ways to legally enter the United 
States.  These are (i) through family preferences, (ii) lottery for underrepresented nationalities and 
refugees and (iii) skills based programs such as the H-1 visas where a prior offer of employment 
commensurate with skills is a requirement for entry.  The first two routes do not discriminate 
between immigrants based on their education or skill levels but the third one has strict skill 
requirements.  If there are already many immigrants from a country, then family preferences makes 
it easier for potential immigrants from that country to enter the US.  On the other hand, if the family 
preferences, lottery and asylum policies were restricted, we should expect to see an improvement in 
the average human capital of immigrants because H-1 becomes the primary route.   
 
4.1.  Empirical results 
 
Table 4 presents the sample statistics for these variables for each cohort.  The tertiary education 
expenditure seems to decline over time - from $5,625 in the 1970s to $4,625 in the 1980s, and 
further to $4,039 in the 1990s.  However, this is likely to be because more observations are 
available for the more recent decades, and the additional data generally came from poorer 
developing countries. 
 
In Table 5, we present the results from an OLS regression with robust standard errors and weighted 
by the number of immigrants from each country in the 1990s cohort within that education level.  To 
begin with we do not include the US immigration policy variable, FP.  In the first column, the 
dependent variable is the country-specific probability that a 34 year old with college degree who 
has been in the US for 6 years obtains a skilled job.  Distance, English and Tertiary education 
expenditure have positive and significant coefficients while Military conflict is negative and 
significant.  GDP per capita is not significant.  The same pattern exists with the coefficients of   18
Military conflict, English and Tertiary education expenditure variables for masters and professional 
degrees as can be seen in columns 2 and 3.  The only difference is with the masters degree in the 
second column where Distance is not significant while GDP is. 
 
The results imply that immigrants from countries where English is a common language and 
expenditure on tertiary education is high perform better in the US labor market.  This is not 
surprising as both increase the relevant human capital of the immigrants for the US labor market.  
For example, coming from an English speaking country increases the likelihood of obtaining a 
skilled job in the US by 11% for a hypothetical college graduate.  Similarly, 10% increase in 
tertiary education increases the same probability by 7.5%
7.   
 
Distance has a positive effect on average immigrant quality, suggesting the costs of migrating effect 
is stronger than the costs of return effect.  And the negative sign on the coefficient of the military 
conflict variable implies that the average quality of immigrants seem to increase with political 
stability.   
 
The parallel regressions for the 1980s cohort are presented in Table 6.  We have fewer countries in 
this regression since the tertiary education data is not available for many developing countries for 
the earlier decades.  When we compare the results with the 1990s, the main change is that the 
Military conflict and English dummies are only significant for the Masters and Professional 
degrees, respectively.  English might decline in importance as the immigrants stay longer in the US 
and master the language, thus is no longer significant in the first two columns.  But it might also be 
a proxy for the legal and educational compatibility of the country with the US and, thus, stays 
significant in the last column for the professional education categories.  Tertiary education 
expenditure continues to be significant, indicating the importance of educational quality of the 
home country on the success of the citizens in the US labor market, even decades after migration. 
 
Consider now how explicit consideration of US migration policies impacts on the quality of 
immigrants.  We introduce the variable FPit into the regressions above for the 1990s cohort and 
present the results in Table 7.  The coefficient is negative and significant, implying that the average 
                                                 
7 An alternative estimation strategy could be to include these country specific variables in the multinomial 
logit instead of the country dummies.  Then we can calculate the marginal impact of a change in one of these 
explanatory variables on the probability of an individual to obtain a skilled job.  We performed this 
estimation and the results are almost identical, as expected.  For example, the impact of an English dummy is 
12% increase in the probability of obtaining a skilled job for a 34 year old who entered the US in 1994.  
Similarly, the impact of a conflict is a decline of 13% in the same probability for an identical migrant.     19
quality of immigrants from a given country declines as these immigration programs are widened.  
All other variables' coefficients maintain their size and significance, except the distance variable, 
possibly because distance is also a determinant of the selection of the immigrants and is correlated 
with our new variable.  Clearly, if the US were to restrict the family preferences, lottery and other 
non-skill based programs, there would be a positive effect on the overall quality of the migrants. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the occupational performance of educated immigrants using US census data.  
We find striking differences among immigrants from different countries of origin which could not 
be explained by differences relating to individuals’ age, experience and level of education.  With 
some exceptions, educated immigrants from Latin America and Eastern Europe perform poorly, 
especially when compared to immigrants from developing countries in Asia and developed 
countries.  Middle Eastern and African college graduates do not do well but the professionals from 
these regions are relatively successful.   
 
We found that a large part of the variation across countries can be explained by attributes of the 
country of origin that influence the quality of relevant human capital, such as expenditure on 
tertiary education and the use of English as a medium of instruction.  Performance is also adversely 
affected by conflict at home, which could have both a quality impact by weakening the institutions 
that create human capital, and a selection effect, by lowering the threshold quality of immigrants.  
US immigration policy also plays a critical role in explaining cross-country variation because a 
large proportion of immigrants from some countries (such as Mexico) are admitted through family 
preferences, visa lotteries and political asylum, whereas more immigrants from other countries 
(such as India) have to rely on employment preferences. 
 
Our results have implications for policy.  Today, public and private resources are being devoted in 
many developing countries to providing university and professional education to those who may 
end up in jobs (domestically and abroad) that make little use of their education.  Obtaining a better 
sense of their eventual destiny should help individuals and their countries improve their allocation 
of resources for education.  For example, if there is a high likelihood of migrating to the US, then 
there may be a higher return to learning English than obtaining an additional degree which is not 
valued in the US labor market.  Greater cooperation between home and host countries, including   20
information sharing about potential needs in the host labor market and predictable visa regimes, 
would help source countries better plan their investments in human capital.   
 
Non-recognition of foreign qualifications and licenses is clearly a big barrier to entry into many 
skilled jobs.  Denial of recognition may be legitimate when home country qualifications are 
inadequate, but in some cases the burdensome re-qualification requirements imposed on foreigners 
reflect the protectionist capture of regulatory processes by domestic vested interests.  Our results 
may suggest that individuals educated in some countries are better equipped to overcome these 
barriers, mainly because of greater compatibility of educational or training standards with the US.  
However, the differences are exaggerated:  the fact that residents of some countries mostly obtain 
visas (H1-B and employment preferences) conditional on an offer of employment implies that the 
visa process and the recognition process are de facto combined.  In the case of other countries, 
where the two processes are separate, there is greater scope for educated individuals to enter and 
then begin the struggle to obtain recognition, and hence greater scope for waste.  In either case, 
more needs to be done, possibly in the context of the services negotiations currently taking place at 
the World Trade Organization, to ensure that qualification and licensing requirements imposed on 
foreigners are not more burdensome than necessary to achieve legitimate regulatory objectives. 
 
Finally, despite the usefulness of these findings, we remain far from answering the question in the 
title of our paper, whether there is in fact brain waste.  A proportion of the variation in the 
performance of immigrants remains unexplained.  Is this due to unobserved yet human capital -
relevant attributes of the country of origin?  Or is it because the market is unfairly and inefficiently 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION  SOURCE 
DIST  Natural log of distance to the US in miles  Andrew Rose datasets available at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/
CONFLICT  The presence of military conflict in the 
home country during the decade migrant 
arrived in the US.  CONFLICT is a dummy 
variable with value 1 if there has been a 
conflict. 
Variable constructed using 
www.prio.no, “Armed Conflict 
Version 2.1” by Gleditsch, 
Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg 
and Strand (2004) 
ENGLISH  English as a main language – dummy 
variable with value 1 if English is the main 
spoken language. 
CIA - The World Factbook, 2002 
EDUC_exp  Natural log of tertiary education 
expenditure (average annual expenditure 
per student per decade, adjusted for PPP) 
WDI-World Development Indicators 
GDP  Natural log of per capita GDP adjusted for 
PPP 
WDI-World Development Indicators 
FP  Ratio of those immigrants who entered the 
US under family preferences, lottery and 
asylum, in the 1990s to the total population 
of the country in 1990.   
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TABLE 1 - Description of data 
 
 
   1990s  1980s  1970s 
# in the sample  102,785  70,061  31,985 
Corresponding population  2,270,463  1,511,287 667,641 
Distribution by Education categories          
Less than 4  8.6% 11.4%  16.4% 
5 to 9  26.2% 26.2% 26.5% 
10 to 12  12.7% 12.6% 10.9% 
High-school  18.6% 18.0% 15.5% 
Some college  11.4% 14.1% 13.7% 
Bachelor's degree  13.0% 10.7% 10.9% 
Master's degree  6.1% 4.6% 4.1% 
Professional degree  1.8% 1.2% 1.3% 
Doctorate degree  1.6% 1.1% 0.6% 
Distribution by Profession categories          
Skilled  13.6% 10.3% 10.9% 
Science  0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 
Professional  0.7% 0.6% 0.9% 
Professional support  1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 
Technician  11.0% 14.1% 14.7% 
Unskilled  72.7% 73.4% 71.9% 
Distribution by Continents          
Latin America  60% 62% 59% 
Asia  19% 22% 20% 
Developed Countries  9% 7%  11% 
Eastern Europe  7% 4% 3% 
Middle East  3% 3% 4% 
Africa  3% 2% 2% 
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TABLE 2 –Probability of Obtaining Skilled Jobs – Different Cohorts and Education Levels 
for 130 countries 
 
 Cohort  1990s  1990s  1990s  1980s  1970s 
 Education Level  Bachelor  Masters  Professional Bachelor Bachelor 
Afghanistan 22%  38%  18%  26%  31% 
Africa, ns/nec  36%  52%  54%  39%  55% 
Albania 14%  29%  58%  14%  0% 
Algeria 31%  49%  66%  10%  78% 
Antigua-Barbuda 66%  78%  68%  26%  26% 
Argentina 51%  65%  70%  42%  43% 
Armenia 21%  37%  39%  28%  18% 
Australia 65%  74%  82%  64%  58% 
Austria 43%  58%  42%  62%  48% 
Azerbaijan 41%  60%  39%  46%  0% 
Azores 0%  0%  0%  50%  46% 
Bahamas 52%  67%  95%  34%  0% 
Bangladesh 21%  37%  69%  23%  28% 
Barbados 56%  70%  91%  41%  36% 
Belgium 63%  74%  67%  48%  62% 
Belize/British Honduras  43%  59%  90%  45%  37% 
Bermuda 63%  78%  65%  49%  20% 
Bolivia 22%  39%  61%  30%  48% 
Brazil 42%  59%  57%  36%  49% 
Bulgaria 37%  56%  65%  27%  0% 
Myanmar 27%  43%  83%  41%  40% 
Byelorussia 34%  54% 34%  49%  59% 
Cambodia   58%  75%  56%  29%  49% 
Cameroon 29%  44%  27%  7%  32% 
Canada 67%  76%  89%  54%  59% 
Cape Verde  0%  0%  0%  18%  53% 
Chile 37%  51%  69%  45%  43% 
China 55%  68%  77%  42%  38% 
Colombia 37%  55%  51%  32%  36% 
Costa Rica  36%  56%  40%  23%  50% 
Cuba 27%  44%  44%  33%  45% 
Cyprus 21%  31%  95%  62%  36% 
Czech Republic and Slovakia 34%  52%  42%  32%  41%   26
Denmark 58%  69%  79%  35%  47% 
Dominica 0%  0%  85%  8%  44% 
Dominican Republic  26%  43%  47%  30%  25% 
Ecuador 21%  38%  61%  27%  27% 
Egypt 31%  49%  80%  36%  49% 
El Salvador  24%  43%  39%  26%  35% 
Eritrea 32%  48%  92%  49%  75% 
Ethiopia 27%  42%  87%  40%  41% 
Europe, ns.  40%  56%  49%  20%  36% 
Fiji 35%  46%  94%  50%  44% 
Finland 49%  62%  52%  43%  51% 
France 54%  67%  77%  42%  46% 
Georgia 28%  45%  78%  0%  100% 
Germany 52%  65%  73%  51%  50% 
Ghana 44%  62%  78%  50%  52% 
Greece 50%  64%  53%  42%  40% 
Grenada 49%  66%  37%  58%  54% 
Guatemala 27%  47%  60%  27%  31% 
Guyana/British Guiana  46%  64%  60%  42%  44% 
Haiti 31%  51%  50%  33%  40% 
Honduras 23%  40%  59%  31%  49% 
Hong Kong  65%  76%  88%  46%  46% 
Hungary 55%  68%  87%  37%  60% 
India 69%  80%  87%  40%  45% 
Indochina, ns  31%  49%  77%  46%  29% 
Indonesia 29%  46%  31%  36%  36% 
Iran 39%  55%  81%  39%  37% 
Iraq 31%  47%  83%  32%  44% 
Ireland 59%  73%  74%  46%  57% 
Israel 55%  66%  80%  48%  42% 
Italy 49%  62%  65%  31%  32% 
Jamaica 42%  60%  50%  46%  49% 
Japan 58%  67%  80%  50%  47% 
Jordan 24%  38%  55%  26%  28% 
Kenya 59%  71%  63%  38%  34% 
Kuwait 39%  51%  89%  18%  0% 
Laos 53%  74%  51%  23%  45% 
Latvia 59%  73%  87%  50%  30%   27
Lebanon 44%  58%  85%  36%  35% 
Liberia 41%  61%  52%  41%  36% 
Lithuania 31%  50%  40%  61%  80% 
Malaysia 67%  81%  85%  50%  57% 
Mexico 24%  43%  36%  21%  27% 
Moldavia 49%  65%  56%  0%  17% 
Morocco 30%  48%  35%  31%  40% 
Nepal 31%  41%  94%  27%  35% 
Netherlands 55%  66%  79%  54%  66% 
New Zealand  56%  65% 89%  62%  56% 
Nicaragua 27%  43%  28%  26%  31% 
Nigeria 42%  59%  72%  50%  36% 
North Korea  45%  59%  79%  36%  35% 
Norway 50%  61%  75%  59%  18% 
Oceania, ns/nec  30%  48%  26%  46%  0% 
Pakistan 38%  55%  80%  33%  41% 
Panama 43%  60%  61%  39%  54% 
Paraguay 9%  18%  10%  0%  64% 
Peru 29%  48%  42%  32%  27% 
Philippines 39%  57%  62%  32%  42% 
Poland 35%  55%  65%  25%  35% 
Portugal 51%  64%  63%  36%  32% 
Romania 40%  59%  70%  41%  40% 
Russia 45%  63%  61%  41%  49% 
Saudi Arabia  38%  51%  79%  58%  0% 
Senegal 24%  39%  28%  34%  0% 
Sierra Leone  42%  61%  29%  26%  46% 
Singapore 68%  79%  81%  74%  58% 
Somalia 34%  55%  53%  50%  100% 
South Africa  69%  78%  88%  56%  39% 
South America, ns  45%  64%  42%  16%  46% 
South Korea  38%  53%  78%  27%  31% 
Spain 44%  56%  74%  53%  64% 
Sri Lanka  57%  70%  89%  47%  55% 
St.  Kitts-Nevis  43%  62%  45%  55%  26% 
St.  Lucia  46%  64%  48%  63%  65% 
St.  Vincent  36%  53%  90%  40%  0% 
Sudan 34%  54%  68%  4%  0%   28
Sweden 57%  69%  74%  44%  40% 
Switzerland 56%  67%  71%  69%  58% 
Syria 20%  30%  74%  31%  43% 
Taiwan 55%  67%  79%  45%  54% 
Tanzania 37%  52%  37%  41%  53% 
Thailand 29%  43%  84%  14%  36% 
Tonga 14%  23%  99%  5%  0% 
Trinidad & Tobago  51%  67%  81%  40%  52% 
Turkey 42%  60%  85%  35%  58% 
Uganda 51%  66%  85%  47%  50% 
Ukraine 39%  58%  62%  46%  29% 
United Kingdom  66%  76%  78%  61%  57% 
Uruguay 33%  47%  71%  46%  47% 
Uzbekistan 36%  54%  39%  54%  32% 
Venezuela 45%  61%  64%  35%  28% 
Vietnam 42%  60%  69%  39%  42% 
West Indies, ns  35%  50%  73%  51%  40% 
Western Samoa  36%  57% 37%  29%  27% 
Yemen 24%  39%  26%  0%  42% 
Yugoslavia (former)  29%  49%  59%  21%  31% 
Zimbabwe 67%  79%  68%  60%  67% 
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   Skilled  Science Profession  Professional  Technical  Unskilled 
            Support       
1990s              
Brazil  29% 7%  21%  7%  13%  22% 
Canada  23% 4%  62%  2%  7%  2% 
China  29% 15%  33%  4%  8%  11% 
Egypt  9% 1%  70%  2%  6%  12% 
India  27% 3%  58%  3%  5%  5% 
Japan  31% 15%  34%  2%  14%  4% 
Mexico  20% 2%  13%  3%  12%  49% 
Nigeria  16% 4%  52%  11%  6%  11% 
Philippines  18% 5%  39%  16%  6%  16% 
Russia  30% 9%  23%  7%  10%  21% 
United Kingdom  46% 7%  25%  3%  15%  5% 
Vietnam  22% 8%  39%  4%  7%  20% 
1980s                   
Brazil  25% 14%  30%  5%  14%  13% 
Canada  20% 2%  66%  1%  8%  3% 
China  33% 10%  27%  3%  15%  13% 
Egypt  19% 3%  54%  2%  13%  10% 
India  16% 2%  65%  2%  9%  6% 
Japan  26% 2%  55%  1%  11%  5% 
Mexico  20% 4%  24%  3%  14%  35% 
Nigeria  24% 2%  54%  5%  7%  8% 
Philippines  22% 2%  38%  10%  12%  16% 
Russia  15% 2%  68%  2%  7%  7% 
United Kingdom  38% 3%  41%  2%  11%  5% 
Vietnam  21% 2%  53%  2%  10%  12%   30
 
TABLE 4 – Descriptive Statistics   
 
   1990s  1980s  1970s 
Distance (miles)  5,608  5,332  5159 
   [1,076-9,450] [1,076-9,450] [1,516-9,398] 
Military conflict  0.333  0.265  0.269 
   [0-1] [0-1] [0-1] 
English 0.411  0.515  0.577 
   [0-1] [0-1] [0-1] 
Tertiary education expenditure per   4,039  4,625  5,625 
student (1995 const.  $ - PPP adjusted)  [298-29,856]  [160-20,041]  [295-21,673] 
Per capita GDP  8,791  8,119  7,306 
(in 1995 const.  $ - PPP adjusted)  [556-27,781] [617-23,893] [589-21,523] 
Share of immigrants in origin country population  
5% 
     
(categories of immigrants: close family, 
relatives, Diversity visa recipients, refugees) 
[0.02%-69%] -  - 
Number of observations  90  68  52 
 
TABLE 5 – Country-level Determinants of Probability of Obtaining A Skilled Job - 1990s 
 
Dependent variable:   bachelor  masters  professional 
Probability of entering a skilled profession          (skld, sci & 
prof) 
Log of distance to US  0.057**  0.033  0.110** 
   (2.32)  (1.56)  (2.70) 
Military conflict  -0.143***  -0.127***  -0.095*** 
   (-3.47)  (-4.10)  (-3.29) 
English 0.114***  0.079**  0.120*** 
   (3.51)  (2.87)  (3.24) 
Log of tertiary education expenditure per student 0.075***  0.069***  0.071*** 
 (PPP adjusted)  (3.21)  (3.14)  (4.34) 
Log of per capita GDP   -0.016  -0.042**  -0.014 
(PPP adjusted)  (-0.54)  (-2.34)  (-0.82) 
Number of observations  90  90  90 
F-statistic 36.96***  17.87***  25.87*** 
R-square 0.656  0.557  0.726 
Notes:  Weighted OLS regression with White robust standard errors.  T-statistics in parentheses.  *** 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level.   31
TABLE 6 – Country-level Determinants of Probability of Obtaining A Skilled Job - 1980s 
Dependent variable:   bachelor  masters  professional 
(skld, sci & 
prof) 
Probability of entering a skilled profession           
Log of distance to US  0.070**  0.051  0.098** 
   (2.32)  (1.45)  (2.88) 
Military conflict  -0.039  -0.053**  -0.029 
   (-1.20)  (-2.17)  (-0.75) 
English 0.025  0.004  0.082** 
   (0.91)  (0.15)  (1.99) 
Log of tertiary education expenditure 0.058***  0.043**  0.059** 
per student (PPP adjusted)  (3.3)  (2.12)  (2.89) 
Log of per capita GDP   0.031*  0.021  0.01 
(PPP adjusted)  (1.76)  (1.13)  (0.47) 
Number of observations  68  68  68 
F-statistic 11.97***  5.70***  8.32*** 
R-square 0.581  0.416  0.536 
Notes:  Weighted OLS regression with White robust standard errors.  T-statistics in parentheses.  *** 
denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 7 – Country-level Determinants of Probability of Obtaining A Skilled Job - 1990s 
with immigration policy indicator included 
 
Dependent variable:   bachelor  masters  professional 
Probability of entering a skilled profession          (skld, sci & 
prof) 
Log of distance to US  0.033  0.019  0.072 
   (1.27)  (0.85)  (1.6) 
Military conflict  -0.141***  -0.124***  -0.098*** 
   (-3.52)  (-4.08)  (-3.53) 
English 0.117***  0.081**  0.123*** 
   (3.71)  (2.94)  (3.83) 
Log of tertiary education expenditure 0.070**  0.066**  0.055*** 
per student (PPP adjusted)  (2.85)  (2.84)  (3.22) 
Log of per capita GDP   -0.02  -0.043**  -0.017 
(PPP adjusted)  (-0.66)  (-2.39)  (-1.05) 
Share of immigrants in origin country population  -0.335**  -0.245**  -0.533** 
(categories of immigrants: close family, relatives, 
Diversity visa recipients, refugees) 
(-2.56) (-1.95) (-2.22) 
Number of observations  90  90  90 
F-statistic 36.77***  17.76***  20.39*** 
R-square 0.672  0.566  0.749 
Notes:  Weighted OLS regression with White robust standard errors.  T-statistics in parentheses.  *** denotes 
significance at the 1 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level; * denotes significance at the 10 
percent level 